Destroyer For Bases Agreement

During the negotiations, U.S. access to bases was extended to several sites in the Caribbean. In a letter from the US Secretary of State to the British ambassador on 2 September 1940, it was stated that the terms of the Destroyers for Bases agreement were easy to say. The United States gave Britain fifty aging destroyers. In return, the United States obtained eighty-nine years of leases for eight British bases in the Western Hemisphere. At that time, the United States was still at peace, but the United Kingdom was struggling to survive the Battle of Britain and repel a possible German invasion. It was precisely because the US moved away from pure neutrality during the war in Europe that the deal was so controversial. In August, talks between Britain and the United States shifted from a loan or sale of the desstructors to an exchange of the desstructors for bases on british territories in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean. Jackson discussed the Destroyer-Bases Exchange at length in the oral history he gave to Harlan B.

Phillips of Columbia University in 1952-1953. Below is a quote from pages 892-893. American and British sailors examine deep loads. In the background are destroyers of the American Wickes class before its transfer When the war went from a “fake war” to a real war on the Western Front, Britain`s need for help continued to increase. President Roosevelt had no problem selling arms, ammunition, and aircraft to the United Kingdom (the United States producing these resources in sufficient numbers). Churchill insisted, however, that his greatest need for desstructors was to protect British convoys from submarine attacks. Britain`s supply of destroyers was a particularly unfortunate problem for Roosevelt. The United States had 200 World War I destroyers in stockpile, 176 of which had just been refurbished and recommissioned.

Certainly, the United States could save 50 ships. However, the recent finance law contained a clause stating that weapons could only be supplied if the head of the service could claim that US forces did not need them. As the chief of naval operations recently testified to the importance of these destructive ships to get money to equip them. The chief of the navy was clearly unable to declare these vessels surplus. (a) that the proposed agreement can be concluded as an executive agreement with effect, without waiting for ratification. As German troops advanced rapidly towards France and many members of the U.S. government were convinced that the defeat of France and Britain was imminent, the United States, through the British ambassador, the Marquess of Lothian, sent London a proposal for the U.S. lease of airfields in Trinidad, Bermuda, and Newfoundland. [5] British Prime Minister Winston Churchill initially turned down the offer on May 27, unless Britain had received something in exchange. . .

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